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Box 1 The National Dialogue as a process 
The project National Dialogue was carried out by a project team and a scientific support team. 
The project team’s main responsibility was to organise and facilitate the dialogue and to report its 
results. The scientific support team provided the dialogue groups with ‘state of the art’ scientific 
information on options to reduce greenhouse gasses in the Netherlands. The members of the sci-
entific support team were as well involved in the project team.  
The project has been carried out in three phases: a design phase, the actual dialogue phase and a 
reporting phase.  
During the DESIGN PHASE the project team interviewed about 100 persons from the four sec-
tors involved on the dialogue’s scope and focus and the possible composition of the dialogue 
groups. These interviews have contributed a great deal to the design of the actual dialogue. For 
each dialogue group, chairpersons were contacted. About sixty persons accepted the invitation to 
participate in the dialogue on an individual basis. In the meantime, the scientific support team 
developed Future Images (see Box 2). The dialogue participants received two notes for approval, 
the first addressing the dialogue’s Scope and Rules of the Game, the second dealing with the dia-
logue’s Process and Schedule.  
The actual DIALOGUE PHASE was divided into three steps: 
1) First, the dialogue groups discussed the Future Images presented by the scientific support 
team. Inspired by these images, they developed two images for their sector, which both took 
–80% GHG emissions as a starting point. These images constituted the point of departure for 
the analysis of options in the second stage of the dialogue.  
2) The groups then selected options for emission reduction for further analysis. They analysed 
the options using the backcasting technique. This meant that the dialogue group took the fi-
nal situation where the option has been implemented as a starting point. For a period of fifty 
years from now, the chances and barriers for the option were identified and the major prob-
lems solved. Finally, the results of the backcasting exercise were visually presented on a time 
sheet.  
3) Finally, the groups compared the outcomes of the separate backcastings in order to identify 
criteria for long-term climate policy. Then, they identified clusters of options that, to their 
point of view, meet their criteria, and identified actors and policy instruments, which they 
considered vital for implementation. 
Each dialogue group has met six times between November 1999 and March 2001. Representa-
tives of each group also met at two joint workshops, where they exchanged interim results and 
discussed their conclusions.  
In the REPORTING PHASE, the findings for each sector were laid down in so-called strategic 
vision reports, sectoral policy briefs, and this synthesis report, which were reviewed by the par-
ticipants. 
For more information about the COOL project, see: http://www.nop.nl/cool. 
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1. The National Dialogue in the COOL project 
The National Dialogue in the COOL project (Climate OptiOns for the Long term) aimed 
at developing insights and recommendations for Dutch long term climate policy, both on 
content and process. The dialogue was carried out in four dialogue groups, which ad-
dressed four sectors of the Dutch economy: Housing, Industry & Energy, Agriculture 
and Transport. For each of these sectors, the dialogue addressed the following question: 
What is needed to realise reductions up to 80% by 2050 (as compared to 1990 levels) for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in The Netherlands? Dialogue participants did not ad-
dress the issue as to whether such an emission reduction would be desirable as a climate 
policy target. Whereas the realisation of –80% for The Netherlands by 2050 was taken as 
a point of departure, the dialogue explored implementation trajectories for reduction op-
tions using a method, which is known as backcasting. It is also important to note that the 
dialogue groups were asked not to fake consensus in their strategic recommendations. 
Hence, the dialogue outcomes articulate differences in view with respect to the preferred 
trajectories for delinking GHG emissions and economic growth.  
This report presents and synthesises the findings and conclusions from the National Dia-
logue taking into account the divergent views among and within the dialogue groups. 
The authors are the only responsible for this report’s contents, especially its recommen-
dations.1  
The conclusions and recommendations laid down in this report are meant for all who are, 
in one way or another, involved in the development and implementation of climate poli-
cies, especially the Dutch government and Parliament, business, and the environmental 
and consumers movements.   
Findings and conclusions from the National Dialogue mostly address climate policies for 
the period 2012 – 2050, that is the period after Kyoto. Section 2 focuses on the analysis 
of options for major emission reductions carried out by the four dialogue groups. Section 
3 presents the trajectories toward –80% GHG emissions by 2050 for the sectors Housing, 
Industry & Energy, Agriculture and Transport. Together, these trajectories indeed count 
for about an 80% reduction potential for the Netherlands in 2050. Section 4 then high-
lights the criteria that, according to the dialogue, should underlie long-term climate pol-
icy. This section also elaborates the doubts and conflicting views from the dialogue on 
long-term climate policy. Finally, section 5 presents recommendations. These are meant 
for the coming 5 – 10 year period, when the Netherlands should prepare for the long 
term and take especially into account the uncertainties and conflicting views that have 
been put forward in the dialogue.  
 
                                                   
1
  A former version of this report has been reviewed by participants and the members of the 
COOL external review committee. It was also discussed at the national COOL conference 
held in Amersfoort on May 11, 2001. The reactions were mainly positive. Some participants 
were critical about the recommendation on CO2 removal and storage.  
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Box 2 Two future images for The Netherlands in 2050 
To encourage the dialogue, the scientific support team developed two future images of The Neth-
erlands in 2050, which both sketch a society that has been able to realise –80% GHG emissions. 
The images are based on two scenarios used by IPCC, which have been quantified with respect to 
the Dutch situation.  
According to the images A and B, for the 1990 - 2050 period, production grows 4 – 6 times. The 
images differ more with respect to the increase in per capita income, as the population size in A 
is assumed to be smaller than in B. Without major technological innovations, the Dutch economy 
would double its energy consumption, compared to 1990 levels. However, it is assumed that be-
cause of major achievements in material and energy efficiency the final energy demand is about 
30% under the 1990 level. A set of plausible choices as regards fuel supply and CO2-removal 
and storage bring down the total Dutch CO2-emissions to 40 Mton/year (= -80% /1990).  
  Image A Image B 
 
World-orientation  Cosmopolitan, Global Village Regions, trade blocks 
Economy  High growth and dynamic,  Moderate growth,  
  market  strong regulatory government  
Social  Individual Community, family 
Physical Environment Sub urbanisation, fragmentation Careful planning 
Transport  Road transport  By train and ship 
Private transport Public transport 
Environmental attitude Economic values Environmental values 
 
Population  (million) 16 19 
GDP  (1990 = 100) 570 440 
Private car, km  (1990 = 100) 170 170 
Agriculture, km (1990 = 100) 65 78 
 
Energy demand  (PJ)  2000 1800 
Fossil  (PJ) 950 400 
Biomass  (PJ)  800 1200 
Solar / wind  135 170 
Nuclear (PJ) 80 0 
CO2-storage (Mton) 50 5 
 
The dialogue groups have elaborated these images for their respective sectors. The groups have 
done this in quite different ways. For Industry and Energy, two technological trajectories were 
defined toward –80% (Clean Fossil and Sustainable). For Transport, a distinction was made be-
tween a sector, which has all freedom to expand, and a sector, which is bound by governmental 
restrictions (Free Way and Moderate Transport). For the Housing sector, it is assumed that the 
dominant factor with respect to emission reduction is the replacement tempo of buildings (The 
renewed Netherlands vs. The familiar Netherlands). For agriculture, the distinction was found in 
different scenarios for the sector under environmental restrictions (Low emission Bulk vs. Mixed 
Landscape). That the groups have used two contradictory images in exploring the viability of re-
duction options explains the range in the emission reduction figures for the sectors, because these 
figures have been calculated for two images per sector. 
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2. Analysis of options for emission reduction 
In order to learn about opportunities for considerable emission reductions on the long 
term, the dialogue has investigated chances and barriers for the implementation of 22 
(mostly technical) reduction options. For each analysis, the groups have taken either one 
of two conflicting images for the sector as a point of reference. Both images unfold a fu-
ture in which The Netherlands have been able to reduce its GHG emissions by 80%, but 
in most other aspects the images contradict (see Box 2). Some options have been evalu-
ated by several groups, i.e. biomass, solar PV and wind. Box 3 gives an overview of the 
22 options that were analysed by the four dialogue groups.  
Box 3 indicates that the dialogue groups have restricted their scope. Obviously, it was 
impossible to analyse all kinds of options given the limited time available for the dia-
logue. In some cases, assumptions were formulated as regards the options that were not 
taken into consideration. The absence of the nuclear option may need some clarification. 
Several dialogue groups have discussed as to whether nuclear should be given attention 
in the backcasting. Arguments for not doing this in the Dutch context are inter alia the 
most controversial character of this option in The Netherlands, the persistence of the nu-
clear waste issue and the limited uranium stocks for the long term.  
All options that were analysed may, potentially, largely contribute to significant reduc-
tions of greenhouse gasses in The Netherlands. However, the implementation of each op-
tion will face considerable barriers, even if the trajectory for implementation is assumed 
to be 50 years. In some cases, there is considerable doubt as to whether implementation 
will be possible at all, such as to draw back the demand for transport through a change of 
individual behaviour. At the same time, opportunities were identified for national gov-
ernment, the EU and private parties. Box 4 presents an overview of the major barriers 
and opportunities as identified in the backcasting exercises.  
In general, the main barriers relate to problems at the level of government (especially for 
options that ask for a joint European approach) and a lack of public acceptance. The 
general trend of government retreat in an era of liberalising energy markets appears in 
conflict with the needs for implementing a variety of climate options. After all, this re-
quires a major role for public institutions in many areas.  
Major opportunities are identified at with respect to technology development and, as an 
opportunity too, public acceptance. Climate policies in The Netherlands can in a positive 
way contribute to domestic comfort, a reduction of traffic annoyance, a more pleasant 
landscape, and will not negatively affect matters that people care about, such as income 
and mobility.  
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Box 3 Options analysed in the four dialogue groups 
 Biomass (Industry, Agriculture, Transport) 
 Chain optimisation of wood (consumption) 
(Agriculture) 
 Combined heat and power (Industry) 
 CO2 neutral greenhouse (Agriculture) 
 CO2 removal and storage (Industry) 
 Draw back demand for transportation 
through behaviour change (Transport) 
 Energy-efficiency in industry (Industry) 
 Fuel cell (Transport); also see under Hy-
drogen) 
 Heat Pump (Housing) 
 Hydrogen economy (Industry, Transport) 
 Measures to reduce emissions by land 
management (Agriculture) 
 Measures to reduce emissions from manure 
and fermentation  (Agriculture) 
 Micro-combined heat and power (Housing) 
 Modal shift from private to public trans-
port (Transport) 
 Modal shift from air to train (Transport) 
 Modal shift from road to water (Transport) 
 Passive solar (Housing) 
 Replacement tempo of buildings (Housing) 
 Sinks (Agriculture) 
 Solar PV (Housing, Industry) 
 Underground transport (Transport) 
 Wind (Housing, Industry) 
 
 
 
Box 4 Main barriers and opportunities  
 Barriers  Opportunities 
 Technology development  
 Vested interests in sector  
 Costs (compared to other options) 
 Public acceptance (a variety of image and ac-
ceptance issues) 
 National government (internal coordination 
and enforcement) 
 European Union (especially coordination) 
 Infrastructure 
 Scarce space 
 Technology development 
 Public acceptance / Image 
 Fit in with trends in sector 
 Efficient use of scarce space 
 National government 
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3. Long term trajectories toward –80% 
For each sector, specific trajectories (packages of options) were identified to realise a re-
duction of emissions up to 80% by 2050. These trajectories are mostly complementary, 
but in some instances they are in conflict with one another.   
Housing 
For the sector Housing two complementary are proposed, one for existing buildings and 
one for the construction of new buildings.  
The package Existing Buildings looks as follows (in this preferential order):  
 Dwelling insulation (roof, crawling space and housing front),  
 Sustainable energy applications (solar boiler, solar PV, wind)  
 Low-calorific heating: heat pump combined with micro combined heat and power 
(CHP), as successor of the high efficiency boiler.  
The package New Buildings consists of (in this preferential order):  
 Integrated design with optimal orientation to the sun and use of day light,  
 Optimal thermal insulation,  
 Balanced ventilation with recovery of heat,  
 Sustainable energy applications (solar boiler, solar PV, wind)  
 Low-calorific heating: heat pump combined with micro CHP, as successor of the 
high efficiency boiler. 
It is assumed that the reduction potential for houses applies at least to the same degree to 
utility buildings. 
The dialogue group has a strong preference for sustainable energy options that can be 
applied at the level of buildings. It also sees a potential for wind energy. It is expected 
that consumers will prefer renewables and are even willing to pay more for this, if 
needed. Only if renewables will prove insufficient to realise -80% by 2050, CO2-removal 
and storage should be applied. Hence, also the fossil part of the energy supply will be-
come CO2 neutral. 
Dependent on assumptions related to the replacement tempo of houses and utility build-
ings, an emission reduction up to 80 – 90% comes into sight. As the replacement tempo 
accelerates, it will be possible to realise somewhat more reductions (emissions related to 
removal and reconstruction of buildings included).  
  
The question remains as to whether electricity from the grid can be produced sustainably 
or clean fossil must be applied as well.  
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Box 5 Emission reductions for two trajectories in the sector Housing 
A calculation for houses shows the following results for 2050: 
 Under autonomous developments (i.e. without addition options), CO2 reduction through im-
proving efficiency in buildings and power stations will exceed the increase of CO2-emissions 
as consequence of the increase of the total building stock. CO2-emissisions go down by 10 – 
25% in 2050 as compared to 1990 levels. 
 If additional reduction options inside the dwelling are used to its maximum potential, CO2 
emissions will further go down to -60 – -70% as compared to 1990 levels.  
 If also ‘clean’ electricity can be supplied by the grid, a further reduction will be possible up 
to 80 – 90% as compared to 1990 levels.  
Hence, a realisation of –80% appears within reach.   
 
Box 6  Emission reductions of CO2 for three conflicting trajectories in the 
sector Industry & Energy  
 Clean Fossil Sustainable   
Energy system 
Hybrid 
Scenario & supply mix Emission 
Megaton 
CO2 
Reduc-
tion 
Emission 
Megaton 
CO2 
Reduc-
tion 
Emission 
Megaton 
CO2 
Reduction 
Low growth 16 75% 15 76% 18 72% 
High growth 26 60% 26 60% 29 55% 
High growth, no mate-
rials eff. 
30 54% 31 52% 34 48% 
       
For an understanding of these figures: The 1990 CO2-emissions for Dutch industry were about 64 
Megaton 
 
Industry & energy 
The first observation with respect to the industrial sector is that a major improvement in 
efficiency is indispensable for the realisation of –80% by 2050. Especially for the short 
and medium term, much is expected from combined heat and power. The second obser-
vation is that all supply options that really matter, biomass, CO2 removal and storage, 
and renewables (wind, solar) are, for different reasons, controversial. However, if an 
80% reduction is to be realised by 2050, it is most likely that all available options should 
be applied, thus efficiency, renewables as well as CO2-removal and storage.   
For the sector, three to a large extent conflicting trajectories have been figured.   
 In the trajectory Clean Fossil, 80% of the energy carriers come from fossil sources, 
natural gas in particular. Here, the focus is on developing a Hydrogen infrastructure, 
CO2-storage, biomass and CHP (combined heat and power). Assumed is a moderate 
efficiency improvement (35% or 0,75% per annum). 
 In the trajectory Sustainable Energy system, about 70% of the energy carriers come 
from renewable sources, imported biomass in particular. There is also a focus on so-
lar and wind. Assumed is a high level of efficiency improvement (50% or 1% per an-
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num). In this trajectory, there is no effort to develop the clean fossil package CO2-
storage, hydrogen and CHP.   
 The third trajectory is a Hybrid, which combines the other two except biomass. It 
includes solar and wind but also CO2-removal and storage, Hydrogen and CHP. For 
this trajectory, a low rate of efficiency improvement is assumed (20% or 0,4% per an-
num).  
The reduction of CO2 emissions for the three trajectories is presented in Box 6. Depend-
ent on assumptions on sector growth, efficiency improvement and the contribution from 
CO2 neutral supply options, the sector industry and energy may realise an overall reduc-
tion up to about 50 – 75% by 2050 as compared to 1990 levels. Additional reductions 
could be realised by the using CO2-neutral feed stocks (biomass in particular) in among 
others the fertilisers and chemical industry. If all these options would be utilised, it will 
be possible to realise a (theoretical) reduction of almost 100% for the industry & energy 
sector.  
Box 7 Contribution to emission reductions by the sector Agriculture  
 Reduction potential*) 
(Megaton CO2-eq.) 
Reduction primary production  
 CO2  neutral greenhouse 9-14 
 Closed stables 2-3 
 Emissions per cow 0.5-1.5 
 Organic fertilizers Uncertain 
 High efficient use of fertilizers 1 
Total primary production 12-18 
Sustainable energy and materials NL  
 Utilisation of agri residuals 0.5-1 
 Manure fermentation 0.5-1 
 Combustion of (dry) manure 1 
 Bio-energy production NL 1 
 Wind farms on shore 1-1.5 
Total sustainable energy and materials NL 4-6 
Sustainable energy sources and materials from abroad  
 Chain optimisation of wood consumption 2 
 Bio-energy production imported (400-500 PJ) 38 
Total sustainable energy sources from abroad 40 
Sinks  
 Increase groundwater level in peat pastures (450 kha) ?5-7** 
 New forest (350 kha) ?1 
 Forest and land management ?1 
Total sinks ?7-9 
  
*)     The reduction potential of the options cannot simply be added because of overlap. 
**)   ? means that the net effect is uncertain 
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Box 8 Energy use figures for transport, translated into CO2 figures 
CO2  emissions in Megaton  
1990 level 28 
Trend 2050 60-75 
Total Effect trajectories 1-3 compared to trend -25 
Technical solutions -15 
Draw back demand -5  
Modal shifts -5 
  
Results for 2050 without CO2 neutral fuels 35-45 (+20-50%) 
 
Agriculture 
For the sector agriculture it is assumed that policies are developed and implemented in a 
European context. Three complementary trajectories are suggested,   
 Measures as regards the primary production: CO2 neutral greenhouses, closed 
stables where animals have sufficient space, organic instead of artificial fertiliser and 
a huge improvement in the efficiency of fertilizer use.   
 Energy production and chain optimisation of wood consumption. Energy pro-
duction relates to the available biomass and on shore windmills. Optimisation of 
wood consumption supposes that wood is primarily used for high-level applications, 
especially for construction, and only in last instance as fuel.  
 It is supposed that interventions in the food chain will, too, significantly reduce 
emissions, but these have not been analysed in the backcasting.   
Next to these trajectories, there are opportunities for sinks as a means to contribute to 
CO2 reductions. Possibilities in this respect are to change cropland into pastures, new 
forests, less deep ploughing, and especially by increasing the groundwater level in the 
peat pastures (this prevents peat oxidation and stimulates the formation of new peat). 
Thereby should however be counted with great uncertainties in the net results.  
Box 7 summarises possibilities for Dutch agriculture to reduce CO2 and non-CO2 green-
house gasses considerably, inside and outside the sector itself. The range in figures is 
caused by different expectations as regards the volume of primary production by 2050.   
 Implementing measures related to primary production renders an emission reduc-
tion of 12-18Mt CO2 eq. This yields 60-80% reduction in the remained emissions 
(5-10 Mt CO2/eq) compared to 1990 level.  
 Energy production and optimisation of wood consumption renders an additional re-
duction in the order of 6-8,5 Megaton CO2-eq. (this is 25-35% of the overall emis-
sions from the sector in 1990).  
 Sinks could render another 7-9 Megaton CO2 (also 25-35% of the sector’s emissions 
in 1990). 
This means that, in total, the sector can be able to reduce 100-150% of its own emissions 
by 2050. Interventions in the food chain are not yet included in this figure.  
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Most remarkable is the sector’s contribution to reductions in other sectors. The shift 
from artificial to organic fertiliser, in combination with efficiency in use, will, if this 
measure is applied outside The Netherlands as well, probably render a reduction in the 
order of 8-11 Megaton CO2 equivalents (N2O en CO2.) This branch of industry will be 
likely to shift its core business in The Netherlands. Cement production will be affected 
by a chain optimisation of wood consumption, as the use of concrete in construction will 
be reduced. In total, agriculture may reduce 14-19 Megaton CO2-eq. in other sectors. 
 
Transport 
For this sector, a general observation is that economic developments leading to an in-
creased demand for transport cannot in such a way be influenced by the sector that this 
will bring the demand down.  
Four trajectories to –80% by 2050 were formulated: 
 The trajectory CO2 neutral transport fuels includes the development and use of bio 
fuels and / or clean fossil transport fuels combined with CO2-removal and storage. 
 The trajectory Technological solutions to draw back energy demand for vehicles 
includes the development and use of efficient vehicles. Hence, it will cost less energy 
to meet total demand for transport. 
 The trajectory Draw back of demand for transport includes behaviour change on 
the side of individual citizens and more efficient commodity transport thanks to ICT, 
which leads to driving less ‘empty’ kilometres. 
 The fourth trajectory is Modal shifts. This includes shifts from road to water, from 
air to rail and from private to public. 
Major breakthroughs for addressing the climate issue are especially expected from the 
first and the second trajectory. However, modal shifts toward low energy / CO2-efficient 
modes of transportation and drawing back the overall demand for transportation are 
claimed to be necessary, too. This claim is warranted by two observations: First, the con-
siderable growth of the sector, which is expected for the decades to come, is likely to put 
a large strain on the availability of CO2 neutral transport fuels. It is thus assumed that 
there maybe limits with respect to the availability of CO2 neutral fuels (e.g. from bio-
mass and renewables). Secondly, modal shifts appear relevant in the context of other is-
sues than climate change, especially those that relate to scarcity of land space and con-
gestion.  
Calculations have been made with respect to the possible energy use developments in the 
trajectories, except the one, which focuses on clean transport fuels. The results were 
translated into figures for CO2, as presented in Box 8. It turns out that energy use by the 
sector, in spite of a package of powerful measures, will increase by 20 - 50% in 2050. 
This figure clearly shows that the use of CO2  neutral fuels in combination with other 
technological solutions, such as the fuel cell, will be indispensable for realising far-
reaching emission reductions. Without this option, the realisation of any reductions will 
become highly uncertain, as the growth of the sector exceeds the impact of efficiency 
improvements. Therefore, the market penetration of CO2 neutral fuels will in the end to a 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 10 
large degree determine as to whether greenhouse gas reductions become realised in the 
sector. Theoretically, reductions up to 100% become then a possibility. 
 
Box 9 Findings for the four sectors in 2050 
Sector Housing Industry & En-
ergy 
Agriculture Transport  
 
Trajectories Existing build-
ings: sustainable 
 
New buildings: 
sustainable 
Clean Fossil: 
CO2 storage, H2, 
efficiency 
 
Sustainable En-
ergy System:  
Biomass, wind, 
solar, high effi-
ciency 
 
Hybrid: CO2, H2, 
sustainable 
Primary sector 
 
Energy and ma-
terials 
 
Sinks 
Draw back of 
demand for 
transportation 
 
Efficiency – 
Modal shifts 
 
Clean fuels 
     
Emission reduc-
tion 
80–90% 50-100% 100-150% ??-100% 
The outcomes of the dialogue in the sectors Housing, Industry & Energy, Agriculture and Trans-
port suggest that reductions up to 80% by 2050 for The Netherlands are possible. It may however 
happen that trajectories identified for different sectors are in conflict with one another. It may be 
questionable as to whether Clean Fossil (Industry & Energy) will be capable of providing suffi-
cient electricity from renewables to houses and buildings (Housing). It is also doubtful as to 
whether there will be sufficient biomass to meet the various claims. After all, both the Transport 
and Industry & Energy sectors put a claim on imported biomass, to meet the energy demand of 
households and businesses and to meet the need for clean transport fuels. An important point to 
be mentioned also is that trajectories may have different implications costly infrastructures. A 
trajectory sustainable energy system supposes high investments that are very different from the 
investments required by a clean fossil scenario. The dialogue has noticed that such inconsisten-
cies do exist but has not addressed them further.  
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4. Choices for the long term 
Box 9 summarises the findings related to the four sectors. From these findings a consid-
erable number of dialogue participants concludes that, under certain conditions that The 
Netherlands cannot all establish or guarantee, such drastic emission figures as –80% by 
2050 becomes imaginable. However, in the dialogue several doubts have been raised as 
to whether –80% may be practically feasible. It will not be possible to implement all op-
tions at the same time. Even within a schedule of about fifty years from now, choices 
may not be avoided.   
This becomes clear if the criteria, which the four dialogue groups have identified as rele-
vant for long-term climate policy, are taken into consideration. They are explained in 
Box 10. The dialogue unanimously concludes that climate policy in The Netherlands 
should foster options that meet the criteria climate effectiveness, sustainability, cost ef-
fectiveness and social support. Yet, these criteria are not always compatible and may 
even be in conflict. At this point, opinions diverge.  
First of all, there are different views and expectations with respect to what is feasible and 
socially acceptable, given the current state of technology. There is a shared assumption 
that the coming decades will show huge technological progress in many areas relevant 
for climate policy. According to some, however, an emission reduction up to 80% by 
2050 will be imaginable even without huge innovations. In their line of argument, it 
maybe concluded that major barriers relate to problems in government (political will, ini-
tiative, consistency etc.), especially at the level of the European Union. Other important 
barriers relate to private sector or consumers’ inertia (especially because of lack of ac-
ceptance). This line of argument shows quite some similarity with the argument put for-
ward in the IPCC Third Assessment Report: Significant greenhouse gas reductions are 
technologically feasible at acceptable costs, but social and institutional barriers are 
enormous.  
Others however, question the social acceptability of measures that are necessary for real-
ising –80% in the present technological context. Here becomes manifest the tension be-
tween on the one hand the criterion climate effectiveness and on the other the criteria 
sustainability and social support. Serious doubts and different viewpoints relate to op-
tions that are considered crucial for realising significant emission reductions.  
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Box 10  Criteria for long-term climate policy developed in de dialogue 
 Climate effectiveness: agreement exists that climate effectiveness should be the most impor-
tant criterion in the stimulation of options to reduce emissions. The other criteria that came 
out of the dialogue may on occasion restrict the criterion of climate effectiveness.  
 Sustainability means social, ecological and economical sustainability (people, planet, profit). 
Not everybody considers the favourable options for emission reduction equally sustainable.  
This especially counts for CO2 storage, biomass and hydrogen. At the same time, it is recog-
nised that the impacts of climate change, even if a world wide reduction is realised in the or-
der of 80% for the Netherlands is implemented, can be such that these controversial options 
cannot be neglected. 
 Long term climate policy and social support have to reinforce each other. According to 
some, this assumes that the climate policy should follow the current developments in the sec-
tor (Agriculture) and that the consumer should be actively involved in this policy (Housing). 
A quite general impression is that important options, such as CO2 storage, biomass and wind 
do not have a high score on the criterion of social support. In turn, the options, which seem to 
have high social support, have a low score on the criterion of cost effectiveness.   
 Cost effectiveness: in a choice between options, the alternative that realises the highest reduc-
tions against the lowest costs will be preferred. It should be noticed that this criterion is 
mainly suitable for comparing options, which are already completely developed. Yet, the 
question is to what extent this can be assumed in the assessment of long-term developments, 
since the uncertainties on the developments of costs are huge.  
 The social support for climate policy will be enhanced if options are offered which do justice 
to the consumers’ freedom of choice. Assumed is that there is a general trend toward more 
consumer sovereignty that will continue over the next decades. This criterion can conflict 
with cost effectiveness. For, some options will only be cost effective if they are applied on a 
very large scale. A hydrogen infrastructure requires large infrastructure investments, but it 
restricts the consumers’ freedom of choice. 
 Governmental / administrative fit points to the preference for options which can be imple-
mented with the current set of instruments in the Netherlands or fit in properly with European 
rules.  
 The criterion consistency of governmental policy especially points to the tension between 
climate policy and liberalisation of the energy market, which has been spotted in different 
dialogue groups.   
 Technical reliability refers to he robustness of options. Some link this criterion to a prefer-
ence for simple, low tech options with a long life time and which are easy to repair in case 
something goes wrong. The dominant culture has a bias in favour of high tech, yet relatively 
vulnerable options.   
 Potential for innovation means that options will be assessed in relation to their capability to 
generate further sustainable technological innovations. The assumption that underlies this cri-
terion is that large-scale innovations will be needed, since the degree of sustainability of op-
tions as CO2 storage and biomass is doubtful. 
 
CO2 removal and storage 
There is concern that carbon, once stored underground, can leak out at a certain point in 
time with potentially serious consequences for local life. Another question relates to the 
possibilities for government and society to manage and monitor underground CO2 for an 
infinite period of time. In addition to this resistance, there concerns have been raised that 
a choice for large-scale CO2 removal and storage will lead to a neglect of sustainable op-
tions, especially the implementation and further development of solar and wind. In con-
trast with this line of argument, it has been put forward that climate change, even if dras-
tic emission reductions will be realised by 2050, may have irreversible impacts on highly 
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valued eco-systems. In this case, CO2 removal and storage can probably not be avoided. 
After all, if the sustainability criterion warrants objections against CO2 under the 
ground, then this same criterion can certainly not lead to accept an ongoing increase of 
CO2 in the atmosphere. An additional advantage of this option is perhaps that, once it 
has proven to be cost-effective, The Netherlands are not so much dependant on other 
countries and Europe in making the transition toward a CO2 neutral energy system.  
It can be concluded from the dialogue that, under stringent conditions, future CO2 re-
moval and storage may meet with sufficient social support. However, the first of condi-
tions to be fulfilled will be the strong support and encouragement of those options that 
are, on the long term, expected to make CO2 storage unnecessary.  
Biomass  
Biomass, too, is not generally considered a sustainable option. There is scepticism with 
respect the availability of biomass, given the amount and diversity of claims in various 
sectors. Concerns have been raised that once more, the industrialised countries, which 
show a rapid growth of energy use and transport, will solve their problems at the expense 
of less well-to-do regions such as South-America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Will food 
security in these regions not be endangered by a shift to large-scale biomass production? 
What negative social impacts can be expected from this? Yet, it is largely recognised 
that, at least theoretically, sufficient land is available for biomass. Starting biomass pro-
duction on these (degraded) lands, will bring considerable benefits to the exporting coun-
tries. Therefore, the problems faced because of a future large-scale biomass production 
and use will not necessarily lead to a rejection of this option. However, the concern re-
lated to its social and ecological impacts renders a plea for sustainable production and 
use (chain optimisation) of biomass. One of the barriers identified in this respect is the 
global climate regime itself, as it provides incentives for dumping biomass from the for-
est right into the oven. 
Renewables 
As on the one hand, the dialogue anticipates a variety of problems related to the sustain-
ability of clean fossil and biomass, on the other it observes that The Netherlands, given 
the current state of technology, face limitations with respect to the potential of renew-
ables (especially solar and wind). These limitations are partly physical in nature (too lit-
tle space for wind turbines and solar panels), partly because of the costs of back-up sys-
tems that are expected to be huge. Nevertheless, there are no limits in an absolute sense –
there is always the possibility of import and, as systems become better linked in the fu-
ture, the necessity of back-ups is likely to decrease. In order to better understand the di-
vergent views on the potential for sustainable options, one must distinguish the positions 
of the various sectors. For the sector Housing, renewables can already make a difference 
now. For this sector, the limits to renewables have not been reached yet. Major break-
throughs seem not required in order to realise –80%. It is also expected that these options 
will meet with a positive attitude among consumers. For these sectors that are most re-
sponsible for current Dutch greenhouse gas emissions, Transport and Industry, solar and 
wind do not constitute a serious alternative for now or the decades to come, though. 
Moreover, the public acceptance of renewables may be questioned, too. It is not unlikely 
that a hypothetical offshore windmill park with a 20.000 Mwe potential along the cost 
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line of Northern Holland (from Den Helder to Zandvoort) will meet with public resis-
tance. Is it sustainable to externalise problems from land to the sea?  
Energy efficiency 
Demand side management is for all sectors a crucial option to bring down emissions. As 
regards the possibilities for further efficiency improvement, opinions diverge. Some are 
worried that the tempo of efficiency improvement (since the seventies about 1 - 2% per 
annum) cannot be maintained. Existing processes get very close to the thermodynamic 
minimum. Hence, a plea is made for the strong encouragement of process innovations 
through broad cooperation between companies.   
Breakthroughs in sustainable and demand side management are also considered neces-
sary as to avoid (too large) claims on CO2 removal and storage and biomass in the future. 
Next to and articulated with the issue of technological feasibility of –80% in a socially 
acceptable way, a variety of views have been articulated with respect to the role of gov-
ernment in future climate policy. Are market instruments and institutions, especially an 
emissions trading regime, adequate, given the necessity of major technological break-
troughs and the implications of many options for infrastructure? Can Dutch government 
and European government make a difference in an era of liberalising energy markets? 
The dialogue observes government as well as big companies take less interest in (funda-
mental) research as an impact of liberalization. Some however expect that the shift from 
regulatory toward market instruments, especially the introduction of a system of tradable 
emission permits, will after some time generate the technological innovations needed. If 
such a system includes a cap, which is regularly revised in a downward direction, op-
tions that are initially too expensive will become cost-effective. Others raise doubts here. 
They put forward that government and not the market is the institution capable to safe-
guard long-term perspectives. 
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Box 11 Conflicting views on the transition toward an -80% energy system  
Emission trading regime / 
other market related in-
struments?  
Technology available? 
On the mid/long term,  As soon as possible 
 
Not yet 
R&D through non-
competitive, cross-sectoral 
cooperation. Major role of 
government in financing and 
R&D infrastructure. 
                                   D 
Long-term standard setting for 
specific sectors or technolo-
gies / combine with ecotax to 
avoid externalities 
 
B 
 
Yes 
                                   C 
To mobilize support for the 
adoption of innovations by 
non-market instruments (cre-
ate lead customers).   
A 
Acceptance and implementa-
tion of options by companies 
and consumers. 
Based on Matthijs Hisschemöller, Magnus Andersson, Marleen van de Kerkhof and Willemijn 
Tuinstra: ‘What we do not know yet about the institutions needed for the transition toward a de-
carbonised economy; A report from the COOL dialogue.’ Paper presented at the METRO Con-
ference on Institutions and Instruments to Control Global Environmental Change, 21-22 June 
2001, Maastricht, The Netherlands: page 16. 
 
Government is especially needed to stimulate and support research & development of a 
(limited) number of technologies and to perform as ‘lead customer’. Moreover, govern-
ment has also a traditional role to play in realising major infrastructure projects.   
Box 11 summarises different views from the dialogue which link insights and percep-
tions as regards the available knowledge and technologies with opinions on the speed 
needed to implement market instruments and institutions. As an ideal-typical representa-
tion, Box 11 does injustice to the dialogue, because many issues, opinions and nuances 
are left unaddressed. What should be especially mentioned here is the observation from 
various dialogue groups that climate policies may benefit from a more active involve-
ment of consumers who are willing to make a contribution.  
In fact Box 11 distinguishes and solves four problems. In cell A an innovation is avail-
able at reasonable costs. Yet, the problem is how to promote its adoption through the 
market. The solution is found in giving CO2 a price. There are a great number of options 
that this problem frame can be applied to. One of these may be CO2 removal and storage, 
provided that safety is not an issue (any more). In cell B, no product is available yet, but 
it is reasonably expected to become available after some period of time. It is also clear 
who (which specific companies) will have to take care of this. Long term standard set-
ting, as proposed for the development and implementation of CO2 neutral transport fuels, 
is considered a market conform instrument that can easily evolve into a system of trad-
able permits. The problems identified in the right column of the table can both very well 
be addressed with market instruments. This is different for the left column of the table. 
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The main difference is that, instead of competition provoked by market (like) instru-
ments, cooperation between parties is considered pivotal for solving their problems. In 
cell C, a product is available but for some reason (there maybe a variety of reasons here, 
including the costs of the product or the absence of a market) it cannot be made available 
through market competition. In order to stimulate its adoption government must use non-
market instruments. The plea for a fixed share of renewables in the energy supply is an 
illustration of this kind of solution strategy. In cell D, the theoretical knowledge is avail-
able but a lot of R&D seems needed in order to put a product in the market. In this case – 
and different from the starting position in cell B- there may even not be a clear idea 
about the kind of product to be developed, the actors to get involved or the knowledge 
needed for realizing a break-through. Options that may fit in with this problem frame are 
breakthroughs in industrial process efficiency, or, for the long term, solar. 
So far, the problems and accompanying solution trajectories have been presented as dis-
tinct and complementary. Together, they could be considered to sketch a trajectory for 
transition in time, starting with R&D and ending with measures to endorse fair market 
competition. In every day practice, however, the distinction between these kinds of prob-
lems may be far from obvious. It already turned out that the question as to whether state 
of the art technology may help in realising major reductions is answered differently by 
the sectors Housing and Industry. To explore the meaning of this point in more detail, ef-
ficiency is taken as an example.  
In the dialogue, divergent views on efficiency improvement were articulated. On the one 
hand, this can be explained by the fact that efficiency is a package including a diversity 
of options. Some are already available and can be implemented soon. Others still require 
fundamental research and technology development. From this observation it might be 
concluded that, hence, the policy instrumentation needed for realisation should also be 
very diverse. However, other participants in the dialogue have put forward opposing 
views, which may justify the inference that the dialogue has articulated conflicting views 
on one and the same issue. The view that technological barriers constitute the main ob-
stacle at this moment can be addressed by a strategy as proposed in cell D, non-
competitive cooperation and strong government support for R&D. In contrast, there is 
the observation that, in the past, efficiency has shown a rapid take-off in response to ex-
ternal pressures (energy crisis, price increase). From this, one may conclude that incen-
tives for further improvement of efficiency will be provided by a regime of tradable 
emission rights (cell A in Box 11).  
This example raises several important questions: Who decides in the decades to come 
what kind of problem is at stake and which solution strategy fits best? Then, when it 
turns out that one does not face one single problem but different ones (in which case the 
views put forward are not really conflicting): How ‘tailor-made’ must a policy be in or-
der to implement the best technology? How ‘tailor-made’ can a policy possibly be in or-
der not to be caught in detail? When get policy instruments in conflict with each other 
and looses policy its transparency and consistency? Up to what level does liberalisation 
allow for far-reaching government support, if this could be lead to the promotion of cer-
tain technological developments at the expense of others? The major challenge in the de-
velopment of long-term climate policy probably lies in addressing this type of questions 
at the crossroads of technology, economy and governance.  
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It is mainstream to assert that an environmental policy must always use a mix of policy 
instruments. As to whether this is always possible or that choices have to be made is a 
somewhat neglected issue. A close examination of National Dialogue unfolds the lesson 
that it is very important indeed to explore and investigate when and how different policy 
instruments may get into conflict. 
Box 12 Some process lessons from the National Dialogue 
 A dialogue group with stakeholders from different expert fields, with different opinions and 
views, will increase the possibility to generate new insights for policy.   
 The success of the group depends heavily on the quality of process support. It is critical that 
the different steps in the process are transparent to the participants.  
 In a demand driven dialogue, it is crucial to choose as a starting point for the discussion the 
wishes, concerns and expectations of all participants.  
 A certain degree of autonomy of the dialogue groups will increase the participants’ involve-
ment in the work of the group and in the end product.   
 The role of scientific support in a dialogue deserves special attention. The information that is 
offered should be accessible, compact and tailor made. Furthermore, a proper communication 
of information is of vital importance.   
 The backcasting methodology results in insights related to chances and obstacles in the im-
plementation of options for climate policy. However, it does not by itself provoke the par-
ticipants to articulate and discuss conflicting views.  
 Using future images and backcasting stimulates a long term scope in the dialogue. These 
methods do not cut-off the participants from their own experiences, opinions and interests. 
This should not be the project’s intention. 
 An extended preparation phase and a good budget are crucial for a proper course of the dia-
logue.   
 To work in an interdisciplinary team requires careful communication and a good working 
plan. This takes time. 
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5. Preparing for the long term: recommendations 
This section presents recommendations on how to get prepared for the long term. These 
recommendations relate to actions taken in the period between now and 2012. They are 
directed to government, business and the environmental and consumers movements. 
Point of departure is the general picture that comes from the dialogue:   
From the National Dialogue it is concluded that emission reductions up to –80% by 
2050 are imaginable. Not all dialogue participants are (equally) optimistic on the 
feasibility of such reductions, though. More in particular, there is considerable 
doubt as to whether these reductions will be possible without causing or aggravat-
ing other problems than climate change here or elsewhere. This leads to the conclu-
sion that –80% may come in reach for The Netherlands in a socially acceptable 
manner if, next to overcoming many social, institutional and psychological barriers, 
in specific areas major technological breakthroughs will be realized. European and 
Dutch governments are supposed to take a leading roll in this respect, but it is 
doubted if they can do this.   
This conclusion indicates on the one hand to a mild optimism, on the other hand to per-
sistent doubts and concerns related to the desirability of certain options and the capabili-
ties of government. An effective long-term government strategy must find a way to deal 
with these contradictory impressions, with the observed doubts and divergent opinions. 
After all, they all point to real issues that must be coherently addressed. The recommen-
dations 4 – 10 below deal with these issues. The dialogue has also generated some 
shared views as regards general factors that will make a long-term climate policy suc-
cessful. These are dealt with in the recommendations 1 - 3. Box 13 provides in addition 
information on specific recommendations for the sectors, developed by the dialogue 
groups.  
General 
1. Use the coming 10 years well! It is already possible to start implementing various 
options for the four sectors. But, although the climate problem is urgent and its ur-
gency is likely to increase the coming period, it is especially important to take due 
time to work out a coherent long-term strategy and take actions accordingly. In this 
respect it is critical to fine tune substance and process, and to coordinate actions at 
the global, European and national level. Also the timing of decisions (not too late, 
but not too fast either) is of critical importance.  
2. Enhance a sustained involvement with the issue! It is essential to create the condi-
tions necessary to enable the transition toward a CO2 neutral energy system. To these 
conditions belong: 
- a sense of urgency among stakeholders and the public at large over a long period 
of time, in order to tame this issue,  
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Box 13 A selection of specific recommendations for the four sectors 
Housing 
- Integrated design, include the use of passive solar energy in building codes; 
- Support solar PV by stimulating agreements between solar PV producers and energy 
suppliers about liability and incentives (government); 
- Stimulate the use of wood in house building; 
- Address the issue of groundwater contamination by antifreeze in heat pumps, generic 
subsidies (government). 
Industry and Energy 
- Measures to stimulate heat power generators in industry, trajectory for linking heat power 
generators with clean fossil options (government, companies); 
- Develop plans to implement a hydrogen infrastructure (step by step introduction or radi-
cal change), (all parties involved); 
- Develop industrial parks in accordance with ecological principles and create agreements 
between companies to coordinate the demand and supply of heating and cooling (sector). 
Agriculture 
- Gradually diminish production and use of artificial fertilizer (Netherlands, sector, EU); 
- Coordinate policies regarding nature and landscape with those regarding the climate is-
sue (sinks) (Netherlands, managers of nature reserves); 
- Create good house keeping on the farm (sector); 
- Make an inventory of sustainable food options (all parties involved). 
Transport  
- Develop long-term standard setting for the transition to a CO2 neutral fuel market (at an 
European level); 
- Internalize the costs of CO2 into the fuel prize (at an European level); 
- Introduce a test for the climate impacts of new infrastructure (Netherlands); 
- Include transport as a part of environmental management systems and certification 
schemes (sector). 
 
- A sustained political will to make sincere efforts (for decades high on the politi-
cal agenda),  
- Consistency of government policy provides private parties with the encourage-
ment to make their contribution. 
Long-term policy must next to (but not in isolation from) existing short-term policy 
allow for critical evaluation. The approach taken in the COOL project, a dialogue be-
tween science and stakeholders from society, may serve quite well to elaborate long-
term strategies. Therefore, it is important to use the process lessons from COOL 
(Box 12 highlights some salient lessons from the COOL process).  
3. Social support for  –80% as a long-term target? The National Dialogue has ad-
dressed the feasibility of emission reductions up to 80% and not its desirability. The 
outcomes from the dialogue and the involvement of its participants justify raising the 
question of establishing a long-term reduction target in the order of –80% in a na-
tional as well as a European context. In order to fully explore the implications and 
impacts of such a decision, sufficient time is needed. Answering such a question 
supposes that the specific themes below are coherently addressed. 
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Themes for long term climate policy 
4. Make an integrated assessment of the effectiveness of instruments and institution 
over time! The COOL dialogue signals a relation between the technological, eco-
nomic and political / institutional aspects of long-term climate policy. It is critical to 
get informed on the effectiveness of instruments and institutions needed to realise re-
ductions in the various sectors. At this moment, an integrated approach to this issue, 
which involves different disciplines, is lacking. Such an approach at the crossroads 
of technology, economics and governance, must shed a new light on the interactions 
between choice of instruments and (unwanted) policy effects over time.   
5. Knowledge, knowledge infrastructure: The dialogue suggests that it is critical to 
heavily invest in fundamental and applied research to force major breakthroughs in a 
European context. It is proposed to establish an international Institute of Excellence 
in cooperation between governments, business and science, which will work on op-
timising solar PV. In a similar vein, initiatives may be taken with respect to hydrogen 
and biomass. These proposals from the dialogue are in contrast with the movements 
of retreat from Dutch government and business with respect to research at this mo-
ment. To stimulate R&D must be accompanied with a critical reflection on current 
knowledge infrastructure, especially on its transparency and its accessibility for de-
manding parties.  
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Box 14  Publications in the context of the National Dialogue 
Arentsen, M. and E. Luiten (2001). Shaping future technology. Position paper for the COOL-
dialogue on climate change options. CTSM, Twente en U&U, Utrecht. 
Bennett, G. (2001). Long-term institutional change and climate control measures in Europe.  
Syzygy, Nijmegen. 
de Boer, J. (2001). Consumptiecultuur en Klimaatverandering. Essay opgesteld in het kader van 
de COOL-dialoog. IVM, Amsterdam.  
Faaij, A., S. Bos, J. Spakman, D.J. Treffers, C. Battjes, R. Folkert, E. Drissen, C. Hendriks and  
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Faaij, A., M. van de Kerkhof, M. Hisschemöller, R. Folkert, H. Jeeninga, M. Kok, O.J. Kuik,  
P. Kroon, A. Seebregts, J. Spakman, D.J. treffers and D. de Jager (2001). Kernthema’s van de 
strategische visie voor het lange termijn klimaatbeleid in Nederland. Hoofdpunten uit de  
strategische visie van de groepen Gebouwde Omgeving, Industrie, Landbouw & Voeding, 
Verkeer & Vervoer van de Nationale Dialoog van het COOL project. 
Folkert, R.J.M. (2001). CO2-opslag: potentieel en milieu/veiligheidsaspecten. Notitie ten behoeve 
van de Integratie Workshop COOL. RIVM, Bilthoven.  
Hisschemöller, M., M. van de Kerkhof and O.J. Kuik (2000). Climate OptiOns for the Long term. 
De Nationale Dialoog – Tussenrapport. W-00/02 IVM, Amsterdam. 
Hisschemöller, M. , M. van de Kerkhof, O.J. Kuik, M.T.J. Kok, J. Spakman, D.J. Treffers, M. 
Spanjersberg, A. Faaij, J. Oude Lohuis, A. Seebregts, P. Kroon, J.A. Annema, H. Jeeninga 
and W. Tuinstra (2001). Backcasting exercities in COOL – De Nationale Dialoog. W-01/03. 
IVM, Amsterdam. 
Hisschemöller, M. (2001). De bestuurlijke aspecten van lange termijn klimaatbeleid. Notitie ten 
behoeve van de Integratie Workshop COOL. IVM, Amsterdam. 
Spakman, J., R. Folkert and G.J. van den Born (2001). Biomassa: potentieel en implicaties.  
Spakman, J., G.J.v.d.Born, G.J.Elzenga, K.W.van der Hoek and R.J.M. Folkert (2001). Relaties 
tussen Landbouw, Klimaat en Beleid. 
Thema III Assessment Team (1999). Informatiepakket fact sheets ten behoeve van de Nationale 
Dialoog. 
Treffers, D.J. (2000). Energiebesparing in de Industrie. Paper voor de Nationale Dialoog van het 
COOL project. NW&S, Utrecht. 
Van Lieshout, M. and A.F.L. Slob (2001). ICT en klimaatverandering. Essay opgesteld in het 
kader van de COOL-dialoog. TNO, Delft. 
Van Luttervelt, P. (2001). De kracht en invloed van de consument. Een ondergewaardeerde 
factor. Den Haag. 
Van Soest, J.P. (2000). Klimaatbeleid voor de Industrie. Essay in het kader van de COOL-
dialoog. LE, Delft. 
Van Zeijts, H., W.J. van der Weijden, and M.C. Hanegraaf. Landbouw en broeikaseffect: 
systeemgrenzen, toekomstbeelden en mogelijke maatregelen. Utrecht, Centrum voor 
Landbouw en Milieu. 
 
6. Market development and the adoption of innovations: In addition to proposals for a 
strong impetus for R&D, the dialogue has pointed to barriers for innovations to pene-
trate the market. Traditionally, government takes on the role of lead customer, that is 
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it takes the risks linked to novel products. Next to government, also environmental 
and consumer NGOs may be of significance here, e.g. by mobilizing lead customers 
who then may become shareholder in the new product.  
7. Implications for space and infrastructure: In close relation to the recommendations 
under 4 and 5, it is critical to get a clear picture of the implications from climate op-
tions for the use of scarce space and infrastructure. Such an assessment would have 
to focus on a variety of issues, such as expansion of the grid, underground or surface 
grid and pipelines, requirements to gas stations, and all kinds of other implications 
with respect to water ways, bridges, landscape architecture, design and management 
of industrial areas, opportunities for (re)locating businesses and the like. As yet, there 
is much to learn about costs, sustainability, as well as the division of labor between 
government and private parties in adjusting infrastructure to climate policies.  
8. Empowering consumers: The potential of consumers as actors in the climate issue 
has so far been underestimated in Dutch climate policy. Attention for consumers 
largely focuses on providing incentives for behavior change at the level of the indi-
vidual. Still, an (organized) intervention by consumers may constitute a stimulus to 
accelerate changes at the supply side. It should be explored what opportunities exist 
to increase consumers’ involvement. A strengthening of the individual responsibility 
and consumer sovereignty must be pivotal objectives in such an assessment. One in-
strument to be further investigated is to provide individual consumers with emission 
rights.  
9. Trajectory Biomass. In this trajectory, all barriers for a large-scale adoption of bio-
mass are looked at in an integrated way. At the international level, initiatives are 
needed to develop a system for certifying sustainably produced biomass. One of the 
major topics should further be as to whether chain optimization is a workable nation-
al and international objective (at this stage the climate regime provides incentives for 
burning biomass). This question also implies the opportunities for developing an in-
ternational monitoring system. Nationally and at the European level, barriers for bio-
fuels, (such as fees for alcohol), must be inventoried and addressed. Research into 
various biomass potentials must be intensified. 
10. Trajectory CO2 removal and storage. This trajectory delivers all relevant information 
to enable political decision on CO2 removal and storage. Special attention must be 
given to safety issues related to transport and underground storage, as well as to 
possible reactions underground. Demonstration projects may be started. The assess-
ment and the decision making should specify under what strict conditions (e.g. safe-
ty, continuation in investments in renewables), when and at what kinds of locations 
CO2 storage will be permitted. Given the nature of the resistance against this option 
and at the same time the opportunities this option may provide to bring down emis-
sions significantly and at reasonable costs, it is for this trajectory even more so re-
commendable to have an open dialogue that is able to define alternatives for deci-
sion.  
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Box 15 Dialogue participants (part 1) 
Group Housing 
D.K.J. Tommel (Chair)   Nationaal Woning Instituut 
E. van Andel    FIWIHEX 
A.W.L.A. Cruyssen   Wilma B.V. 
R. van Gurp    Gemeente Tilburg 
J.C. Heemrood    Nationaal Dubo Centrum 
Ms J. Hofman    Le Clercq Planontwikkeling B.V. 
A.A. Koedam    Aedes Vereniging van Woningcorporaties 
J. Kristinsson    Architecten- en Ingenieursbureau Kristinsson 
P. van Luttervelt   Global Action Plan 
Ms M. Quené    NUON 
A.R.W. Snelders   Siemens Nederland 
E. Stigter    Ministerie van VROM 
C. Zijdeveld    Schiedam 
 
H. Jeeninga (scientific support)  ECN Beleidstudies 
J. Oude Lohuis (scientific support)  RIVM  
J. Spakman (scientific support)  RIVM 
Ms M. van de Kerkhof (Secretary)  Instituut Voor Milieuvraagstukken 
 
Group Industry and Energy 
M.E.E. Enthoven (Chair) NIB Capital 
A. Altevogt Greenpeace Nederland 
C. Bronke DSM 
H.E. Brouwer Ministerie van EZ 
J.P. van Buijtenen Vereniging Gasturbine 
E.J. Postmus N.V. Gasunie Nederland 
G.N. van Ingen Akzo Nobel Energy B.V. 
P.W. Kwant Shell International 
W.J. Lenstra Ministerie van VROM 
N.A. Manders Essent Energie 
P.E. Metz European Business Council for a Sustainable 
Energy Future, e-
5
  
J. van der Sar Kerk en Wereld 
J.P. van Soest CE 
Ms W.A.S. Stibbe Stibbe Milieu Consultancy 
F.H.A. Winkelman CORUS B.V. 
 
A.P.C. Faaij (scientific support) Universiteit van Utrecht, NW&S 
J. Oude Lohuis (scientific support) RIVM  
Ms M. van de Kerkhof (Secretary) Instituut Voor Milieuvraagstukken 
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Box 15 Dialogue participants (part 2). 
Group Agriculture 
Ms J.C.M van Eijndhoven (Chair)  Rathenau Instituut  
W.G. Albrecht     Platform Biologica 
A. van den Brand    WLTO 
L.J.M. Dielen     Stichting Bos en Hout 
D. Dijk     Rabobank 
Ms P. Hazenberg    Nederlandse Bond van Plattelandsvrouwen 
F. Hoogervorst     LTO glastuinbouw 
A. van Hoorn     Ministerie LNV 
R. Kalwij     COSUN  
H.P.M. Opsteegh    LTO veehouderij 
S. Schöne     Wereld Natuur Fonds 
 
R.J.M. Folkert (Secretary)   RIVM 
D. de Jager (scientific support)  Ecofys 
J. Spakman (scientific support)  RIVM 
 
Group Transport 
P. Bouw (Chair)    Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat 
P. Clausing    ANWB 
J.M. Dekkers    Nationale Havenraad 
A. Douma    Holland Rail Consult 
H. Leemreize    FNV 
H. van Manen    van Gend en Loos 
G.H.J. Peters    Milieudienst Rijnmond 
A.B.M. van der Plas   Nederland Distributieland 
P.H.P. Sierat    Verachtert B.V. 
E.M. Storm    Ondernemersvereniging SIVN 
L. Tegelberg    Lacis Nederland B.V. 
B.B.W. Thorberg   Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
T. Wams    Vereniging Milieudefensie 
 
J.A. Annema (scientific support)  RIVM 
Ms S. Bos (scientific support)  ECN 
M.T.J. Kok (Secretary)   RIVM 
P. Kroon (scientific support)  ECN 
 
 
